TOWARDS A SCIENTIFIC LAW

EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS.

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"In all matters it is very healthy to put,

from time to time,

a question mark

in what we have taken for granted"

BERTRAND RUSSELL

Executive Summary

This paper proposes to transform law - currently a social technique - into a scientific law, following the epistemological **and methodological framework** of **Mario Bunge**.

The central idea is that legal norms must be based on objective **social laws and** submit to **empirical contrast**, adopting the scientific method as a strategy for research and continuous improvement.

Diagnosis

Law is not pseudoscience, but it operates as a protoscience or pre-scientific technique, **lack** of **solid theoretical basis**and of **systematic verification**The disconnect between legal technique and social science limits its effectiveness and

predictability. Conceptual vagueness and the absence of explicit self-correction mechanisms generate inefficiency and dogmatism.

Conceptions of Historical and Scientific Progress

Enlightenment to the Twentieth Century

Enlightenment thought conceives history and science as **progressive processes:** Kant, Hegel, and Marx advocated for gradual advancement that, after the optimism of the eighteenth century and the postwar pessimism, continues to accumulate knowledge.

In the scientific realm, the empirical-rational method of Bacon, Descartes, and Comte promised social improvements with each discovery; Darwin introduced the concept of evolving theories; and in the twentieth century, Popper, Kuhn, and Laudan challenged the linear-accumulation model by demonstrating that progress occurs through **falsifications, paradigm shifts, and dynamic research programmes**.

Methodological proposal

Inspired by Bunge's eight-step research cycle

1. Formulate legal problems as empirical questions.
2. Pose social hypotheses (norms as conjectures).
3. Derive logical consequences.
4. Design contrast techniques.
5. Run tests and collect data.
6. Interpret results.
7. Evaluate the validity of hypotheses and methods.
8. Define the domain of validity and new problems.

Convergent Epistemologies of Scientific Progress: Bunge, Popper, Kuhn, and Laudan

Bunge, Popper, Kuhn, and Laudan all agree that genuine progress hinges on bold conjectures, rigorous empirical testing, and systematic self-correction.

Bunge's eight-step cycle treats each legal norm as a hypothesis to be deduced, tested, and refined—a direct echo of Popper's falsificationist mandate to discard theories that fail their tests.

Kuhn's model of "normal science" interrupted by paradigm-shifting anomalies parallels Bunge's handling of unexpected results in his final validation step.

Laudan enriches this picture by evaluating "research traditions" according to their real-world problem-solving effectiveness, insisting that a theory's value lies in its capacity to resolve significant puzzles rather than simply amass data.

Together, they underscore the need for **precise concepts**, **coherent theoretical systems**, **empirical verifiability**, and the **agility** to evolve when evidence demands it.

From Norms to Hypotheses

Kelsen and Ross's Blueprint for Empirical Legal Science

Hans Kelsen and **Alf Ross** converged on viewing law as a rational, precise system **open to empirical testing**. For both, law's defining feature was its status as a normative science—a coherent, hierarchical, and autonomous order in which every concept is defined with conceptual precision, including a clear distinction between validity and efficacy and exact definitions of terms and categories. They championed a **hypothetico-deductive method**, deriving normative consequences from fundamental postulates and formulating each norm as a testable hypothesis about future court decisions that can be verified with real-world data. This **predictive and**

empirical focus, together with a commitment to **self-correction** —using empirical results to refine or discard ineffective norms— forms **the core methodology that Bunge later adopts to transform law** into an applied science capable of explaining, predicting, and improving its own rules.

Key elements for a scientific right

Conceptual clarity and precision: "clarify" legal terms and reduce vagueness. **Theoretical systematization**: organize legal concepts on social theories, not just tradition or doctrine. **Empirical foundation**: norms based on verified social laws. **Autocorrect:**review or discard ineffective standards based on evidence. **Explanatory and predictive functions**: anticipate the effects of laws and explain legal phenomena on a scientific basis.

Recommendations

Integrate methods of sociology, economics, psychology, statistics, among other disciplines, in legal research. Formulate laws such as **testable hypotheses** before and after its promulgation. **Evaluate standards** for its consistency with objective social laws, not just authority or tradition. **Institutionalize review mechanisms** based on data and evidence, applying metrics that allow measuring results and establishing accountability.

1. INTRODUCTION: BUNGE'S EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE CHALLENGE OF LAW

The debate on the nature **of law** and his epistemological **status.** It has been a constant in so-called legal philosophy, formulated in a more or less implicit manner.

The question of whether law is a ***science***, a ***technique***, just one ***humanistic discipline*** or even a ***until*** It is not a mere question of classification, but it has profound **implications** in its capacity to **evolve** and to **contribute** in a sustainable

way **social development**.

According to Mario Bunge, the **engines of modernity.** They are science and technology, disciplines that, despite their undeniable influence, are often misunderstood and confused.

The absence of science and technology is a determining factor in the **underdevelopment**, a statement that logically extends to legal systems. The task of this *paper* is, therefore, **to trace a path** so that the law, traditionally anchored in doctrine and exegesis, can achieve a plausible approximation to a **scientific status and**, thereby, develop their capabilities more deeply and effectively.

The conceptual framework of Mario Bunge, presented in his central work ***"Scientific research"*,** provides a **rigorous scaffolding** to **address this challenge**. Bunge establishes a clear demarcation criterion that allows **distinction** between **science, protoscience and pseudoscience** His vision demands that knowledge be rational, systematic, accurate, verifiable and, consequently, fallible.

This approach not only separates scientific knowledge from that which is not, but also places it on a spectrum of rigor. Law, in its current form, is not a pseudoscience, since it does not refuse verification nor lack self-correcting mechanisms, even if these are informal and slow. However, its status could be closer to that of a***"protoscience"***or a***"pre-scientific technique"*** if their "laws" (= legal norms) **lack a solid theoretical basis** and are not explicitly **based on objective social laws.** The goal of this analysis is precisely to guide the **transition** of this discipline towards approaching a consolidated social science, taking advantage of the Bungean methodology as a roadmap.

The core of Mario Bunge's methodological proposal is condensed into a research cycle of eight **steps:** (1) formulation of well-defined problems, (2) invention of well-founded conjectures (hypotheses), (3) derivation of logical consequences of the hypotheses, (4) design of testing techniques, (5) execution of tests, (6) interpretation of

results, (7) estimation of the validity of the conjectures and techniques, and (8) determination of the domain of validity and formulation of new problems.

This process, which Bunge considers **the essence of the scientific method**, will be the model to follow for proposing the creation of a scientific law. This report will explore the application of these principles, from conceptual clarification to theory building, demonstrating how a rigorous methodology can transform the legal discipline.

2. THE PILLARS OF THE BUNGEAN SCIENTIFIC APPROACH AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR LAW

2.1. THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD AS A RESEARCH STRATEGY

For Bunge, the **scientific method** is a***"research strategy"***which applies to a complete research cycle and is independent of the subject under study. It is not a set of mechanical and infallible instructions, but rather a **procedure** to address intellectual problems that require imagination, rigor, and prior knowledge to start from. The application of this strategy to law involves a **fundamental redefinition** of its processes.

A legal problem, in this context, transcends the mere dispute between parties or the question of the correct interpretation of a rule. It becomes an empirical **question** well-formulated about the functioning of a legal system or the effect of a rule, such as: ***"What impact does the implementation of Law X have on crime rate Y?"*** The answer to this question cannot be a simple statement of principles, but the formulation of a conjecture or **social hypothesis**: ***"Immigration Law Z, by toughening penalties, will reduce illegal immigration"*** The next crucial step is the **contrast**, the process of testing this hypothesis. In the legal field, this cannot be limited to doctrinal analysis, but must resort to **collection and analysis of empirical data**, such as statistics, surveys and case studies, to **verify whether the**

hypothesis is fulfilled in reality.

2.2. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PURE SCIENCE, APPLIED SCIENCE AND SOCIAL TECHNIQUE

One of Bunge's most important contributions is his **taxonomy of knowledge**, which distinguishes between ***pure science***, ***applied science*** and ***technique (or technology)*** This distinction is key to understanding the current role of law and how it can be improved.

Pure Science: Its objective is purely cognitive, that is, to increase knowledge of the world of facts.

Applied science: It is oriented towards a long-term utilitarian goal, using pure knowledge to solve specific problems.

Social Technique: Its goal is utilitarian in the short term, seeking***"improve man's control over the facts***"

It is in this category where Bunge classifies the law Legal practice, legislation, and jurisprudence are, in essence, techniques that use rules to achieve a desired end.

The classification of law as a***"social technique"***does not imply a devaluation, but rather an accurate description of its function. The root of the ineffectiveness of many legal systems lies in a **fundamental disconnection** between technology and science. Law, as technology, uses*"work rules*" to operate; but if these rules are not **based on scientific laws** (in this case, of social sciences such as economics, sociology and psychology, among others), its application becomes analogous to an *"empirical recipe"*or a simple *“pre-scientific technique”*.

To give a very simple example, a law establishing price controls, conceived without a thorough analysis of the laws of supply and demand, is a social technique without a scientific basis, which condemns it to unpredictable or undesirable results **science** discover the laws (knowledge of how society works), and the **technology** (a

right of a scientific nature) applies them to produce desired results. The lack of this link between science and technology is thus presented as an obstacle for the real progress of the discipline and its effectiveness in applying it.

2.3. KNOWLEDGE AS A PERFECTIBLE ENTITY

One of the defining characteristics of scientific knowledge for Bunge is its **fallibility.** Science does not produce*"final and unquestionable truths"*, but a*"fallible knowledge that may have errors but is perfectible"*". This **self-correcting quality**It is one of the greatest advantages of science over other forms of knowledge.

In law, doctrine is often presented as a system of principles*"immutable"*and truths*"eternal"*. However, in practice, it is a system in **constant change**, through jurisprudential interpretation and legislative reform. A scientific law would turn this adjustment process into an explicit mechanism of **methodological self-correction**. Jurists and legislators would act in a manner **similar** to scientists, who believe that a single piece of data that does not match the hypothesis has more weight than thousands of confirmations.

In this context, an unexpected court ruling or the failure of a legal policy would not be seen as an anomaly to be ignored, but as a*"made*" which refutes the*"law"*(the legal norm) in its particular application. This *"error"* would not hide, but **would be analyzed** to find one **new hypothesis or** broader **social law** that would explain the exception. This constant process of **review and improvement would** make law an open and progressive discipline, as opposed to a dogmatic and closed system.

3. CONCEPTUAL CLARITY AND PRECISION: THE FOUNDATION OF A RIGOROUS LAW

3.1. THE LOGIC OF THE CONCEPT AND ITS FUNCTION IN THE STANDARD

The **conceptual precision is** a pillar of Bungean science, which rebels against

the ***"vagueness and superficiality"*** of common sense. The meaning of a concept is defined by the conjunction of its **intensity the understanding** (the set of properties that characterize a meaning; e.g. triangleIt is a three-sided figure. Answer the question*"what is it"*) and its **extension or reference**(the set of real objects to which it applies; e.g. such a drawing is a triangle. Answer the question*"what it applies to"*).

In the legal field, concepts such as*"crime", "contract", "damage"* and *"responsibility"* are the key terms of normal and habitual discourse. A scientific right would require that the intensity of the understanding of these concepts, that is, the set of properties that compose them, is as clearly defined as possible. At the same time, their extension or reference (the "real" social facts to which they apply) must be perfectly identifiable.

The **vagueness** and **ambiguity** conceptual in law is the **fountain** of the **most** of the **doctrinal debates**, which often become sterile, very similar to word contests or a kermesse of verbal occurrences.

The **vagueness**It appears when a standard uses a term without clearly marking its limits. An example would be the expression*"reasonable period"*

The **ambiguity**It arises when the same expression can be interpreted in more than one way, so that different parties understand different things. An example would be*"pay for services"*

The first step towards the scientific nature of law is, therefore, the ***"exactification"*****of their concepts**, a rigorous analysis process that transforms legal interpretation from a slippery slope *hermeneutic art* in a rigorous *categorization technique* based on **explicit and verifiable criteria.**

3.2. VAGUENESS AND BORDERLINE CASES IN LEGAL LANGUAGE

Mario Bunge distinguishes the **intentional or comprehension vagueness**, which is the indeterminacy of the properties of a concept, of the **extensional or**

reference vagueness, which refers to the indeterminacy of its domain of application. Both are **challenges** in the legal discipline.

The **intentional vagueness**It is expressed in legal terms as *"good faith"*, *"due diligence"* or the one already mentioned*"reasonable period"*, which lack a comprehensive and precise set of properties. This is when it is not entirely clear **what exact characteristics** a concept has. **Legal example:** *"Good faith*" in a contract. There is no closed list of conducts that say "This *is always good faith"* and *"this is never the case"* In a claim before the courts, it would depend on the judge's interpretation or the circumstances. **Everyday example:** *"Be tall"*At what height is a person*"high*"? There is no exact limit.

The **extensional vagueness is** observed in the difficulty of applying a standard to*"borderline cases*", that is, to situations that do not clearly fit into the definition of a legal concept. It is when it is not clear to **which specific cases** a concept is applied. **Legal example:** A law that prohibits *"vehicles"* in a park. A car is clearly a vehicle (clear case). A bicycle is probably also (clear case). And an electric skateboard? Or a motorized wheelchair? These are **borderline cases**: they do not fit the definition perfectly, and it is necessary to decide whether they fit in or not. **Everyday example:** If we say*"no pets allowed"*Does a fish in a tank count as a pet? And what about a hamster? These are cases that raise questions.

And **scientific law** would not seek to eliminate all vagueness, as Bunge recognizes that this is often impossible. Instead, it would focus on ***"improving accuracy"*** through the **investigation**.

This would involve going from **intuitive definitions *"working definitions"*** to the ***"operational definitions"*** that allow a jurist to determine, with a degree of measurable **precision**, whether or not a particular case belongs to a category. All vagueness cannot be eliminated, but it can reduce **it**. Go from vague **definitions** (*"good faith"*) to operational **definitions**: for example, instead of just saying*"good*

faith", detailing specific behaviors that demonstrate this (reporting relevant changes, not withholding data, meeting deadlines, etc.). This helps a judge, lawyer, or citizen decide with greater certainty whether a case falls into this category.

3.3. PRE-THEORETICAL AND THEORETICAL SYSTEMATICS IN LAW

A **systematic**It is an organization of concepts into hierarchies that reflect objective, not just logical, relationships. Let's give a simple example of its practical scope. Biological taxonomy is Bunge's classic example, where classification has evolved from a *"alpha systematics"* (pre-theoretical, based on external morphological characters: what I see) to a *"phylogenetic systematics"* (theoretical, based on the theory of evolution: where what I see comes from or how it arises).

An applied example is the so-called Kelsen Pyramid. In alpha systematics: I only look at the "*label*" of each rule: Constitution. Laws. Decrees Regulations. In phylogenetic systematics: I follow the "*lineage*" of the power that creates them: The Constitution grants the power to make laws. Laws authorize the Government to issue decrees. Decrees authorize the drafting of regulations.

The law, in its current form, already has a hierarchical structure of concepts (types of crimes, types of contracts, etc.). This is the **"pre-theoretical systematics"** of law, analogous to that of pre-Darwinian biologists. A scientific law, on the other hand, would develop a **"theoretical systematics"**, where the hierarchy of legal concepts is not only based on the logic and tradition of the authors' doctrine, but is explicitly grounded in **underlying social theories.** For example, a classification of crimes would not be based solely on the severity of the harm, but would be articulated by a sociological theory about the causes and mechanisms of criminal behavior. This systematization would be more than a catalog; it would become a*"research instrument*"and a representation of the"*objective structures*"of social reality.

Below is a diagram to illustrate how the **legal concepts** can be **analyzed and**

classified according to Bunge's typology:

BUNGEAN CRITERIA	LEGAL CONCEPTS
Formal Concepts	Legal logic, rules of inference, set theory applied to normative categories.
Descriptive Concepts	Terms that refer to observable facts and material evidence, such as 'witness', 'document', 'signature', 'contract'.
Theoretical Concepts	Constructs that are not directly observable, but are postulated to explain phenomena, such as 'guilt', 'intention', 'good faith', 'civil liability', 'legal causality'.
Prescriptive Concepts	The deontic language of law, which establishes norms, mandates and prohibitions, such as 'must', 'prohibited', 'permitted'.

4. THE HEART OF SCIENTIFIC LAW: HYPOTHESES, LAWS AND RULES

4.1. FROM LEGAL HYPOTHESIS TO SOCIAL LAW

For Mario Bunge, scientific **knowledge** advances through the formulation of **hypotheses** (conjectures about reality) and its subsequent **confirmation**, which makes them **laws.** The proposal for a scientific right is to conceive the legislative process not only as an act of political will, but as a very rigorous exercise of *"invention of conjectures"* A new law or regulation is, in this sense, a **social hypothesis**: *"If rule X*

(means) is implemented, then effect Y (end) will occur"

This approach **opposes inductivism**, which postulates that laws arise from the mere generalization of observations. Bunge rejects this idea, arguing that theoretical laws **are invented**, **and are not induced** by the **data**.

In the same way, a legislator **can't** limit oneself to **notice** a social problem and then *"induce"* a norm. It must, instead, **postulate a theoretical hypothesis** that explains the causal mechanisms of the problem and propose a solution that is based on an understanding of those social dynamics. In a **scientific law**, the legislator not only votes by political will, but acts **as a scientist**: makes conjectures about society, tests them, and adjusts its laws based on the results.

The method for scientific law is, therefore, **hypothetical-deductive.** The method applied is a four-step cycle: formulate the hypothesis *"if X, then Y"*, deduce the intermediate mechanisms, apply and measure the impact, and adjust the standard according to the results.

4.2. BUNGEAN CHARACTERIZATION OF A SCIENTIFIC LAW

For one hypothesis be considered **scientific law**, must comply with several requirements**:**

Generality: The law must place singular facts in*"general guidelines"*A social law, unlike a particular event, is a **regularity** that applies to a class of facts.

Systematicity: The law must be a component of a coherent system of ideas, that is, **a theory** scientific laws do not exist in isolation, but are logically interrelated.

Corroboration and Verifiability: The law must be *"verifiable"* through the **experience**.

In a scientific law, the*"laws"* (= the social regularities underlying the norms) must comply with those **three criteria.**

For example, a criminological theory on the relationship between socioeconomic conditions and crime must be **genera**l (= applicable to various populations), **systematic** (= be integrated into a coherent sociological or economic theory) and, above all, **empirically verifiable**.

4.3. THE "RULE OF LAW": THE LINK BETWEEN SOCIAL CAUSALITY AND LEGAL NORM

The concept of ***"the rule of law"*** Bunge's principle is fundamental to this proposal. This principle, of an ontological nature, postulates that ***"every event satisfies a set of laws"*** They do not exist *"miracles"* or facts *"lawless"* In the world, both natural and social, everything is governed by **patterns of causality.** The legal norms, in this framework, are those laws, but **technological rules** that are based on them.

The distinction between the **objective social law** and the **legal norm** (= the law for the right) **is the key to a scientific right.**

An objective **social law** is a pattern of reality (for example,*"The increase in unemployment is correlated with the increase in crime."*). The **legal norm** is a prescription or a*"founded rule"*who uses that knowledge to achieve a practical end (e.g.,*"If a crime is committed, a penalty will be applied."*).

The validity of the legal norm does not depend only on the **authority** that emits it, but of the **truthfulness and effectiveness** of the social law on which it is based. Bunge illustrates this with the example of the oxidation of iron: the rule *"protect the iron from moisture" is* effective because it is based on scientific law "*Iron rusts in the presence of moisture*".

In the same way, a **legal norm** is a *good rule* only if it is based on an objective **social law.** The **confusion** among these **two different concepts** is the**main obstacle for** the advancement of law.

When a rule **fails** in its application (for example, a law that seeks to reduce crime does not achieve this), there is discussion about its **interpretation** of **political will** behind her, instead of questioning the **underlying objective social law** which was assumed to be true.

A scientific right would require that standards be **evaluated** for its foundation in laws of statistics, economics, sociology, social psychology or psychology, even neurobiology and genetics, and that they are reviewed or discarded and empirical **evidence demonstrates** that the social laws on which they are based are incorrect.

STATEMENT	NATURE	LEGAL EXAMPLE
Objective Social Law	Pattern of reality; constant relationship between facts.	The relationship between impunity and crime.
Legaliform Formula	Scientific hypothesis that reconstructs an objective law.	The sociological theory that postulates the causal relationship between X and Y.
Grounded Rule	Practical standard based on a legal-formal formula.	The law that classifies conduct X as a crime and assigns sanction Y.
(Social) Fact	Singular, empirical event.	The commission of a crime in particular.

5. LAW AS A THEORETICAL SYSTEM: EXPLANATION, PREDICTION AND CONTROL

5.1. LAW AS A BODY OF THEORIES

A **theory,** for Bunge, is the *"nervous system of science"*[1], and *"hypothetico-deductive system"* that organizes a **set of interrelated hypotheses.** Theories are not simply a collection of isolated ideas, but rather conceptual structures that seek to explain and predict.

A scientific right should conceive its **own body of knowledge** as a system of theories. A legal code, for example, would not just be a list of rules, but a **formulation of *"postulates"* and *"definitions"*** which, together, seek to explain social behavior and guide rational action.

Although Bunge recognizes that social phenomena are complex, he maintains that there are **mathematical models** to **explain them**. Although *"mathematization"* is a challenge for law; a scientific law would seek the precision and predictive capacity that mathematical formalization can offer.

5.2. THE EXPLANATORY AND PREDICTIVE FUNCTIONS OF LAW

The functions of a scientific theory are, for Bunge,**explain facts** in terms of laws, and **explain laws** in terms of principles. Science seeks to answer more than just*"because"* mainly to *"as"* A scientific law could fulfill these functions in a rigorous manner.

Explanatory Function: Could you explain why a breach of contract occurred, not only by identifying the clause that was violated, but also by referring to the social forces (psychological, economic, etc.) that led the party to act in that way?

Predictive Function: A scientific legal theory would predict with a degree of **measurable probability** the impact of a new law or judicial reform on society. This provides a more solid and reality-based basis for legislative and judicial decision-making, going beyond mere ***"intuition*" legal**.

5.3. THE ROLE OF EMPIRICAL CONTRAST AND THE SELF-CORRECTION

OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM

A **scientific theory** must be ***"verifiable"*** **and** ***"contrastable"*** through experience.

In law, this means that rules should not only be logically **coherent,** but thatIts effectiveness must be evaluated through data and evidence: **measure your results.**

The contrast of a legal hypothesis (= the proposal of a rule) would imply the use of **social science methods**, like the **statistics** and the **impact studies.** A scientific right would therefore be, **intrinsically self-correcting**: If data show that a standard does not have the desired effect, it should be revised or replaced.

Bunge highlights that in science, a single piece of data that *"if it doesn't match the facts, it has more weight than a thousand confirmations."*. In law, the*"exception"* or the *"anomalous case"* should not be discarded, but should drive the search for a **new hypothesis** or a **broader law** that adequately explains the anomaly. This process of **constant feedback** would transform the law from a dogmatic system to an open and progressive one.

BUNGEAN CRITERIA	APPLICATION TO SCIENTIFIC LAW
Rationality	The consistency of the standard with higher legal principles and social laws.
Objectivity	The correspondence of the norm with objective social laws and its independence from prejudices.
Clarity and Precision	The exact definition of legal terms to reduce intentional and extensional vagueness.

Verifiability	The ability to empirically contrast the impact of a standard on society.
Systematicity	The integration of standards and theories into a coherent system.

6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SCIENTIFIC LAW

The law, in its current state, is largely a **social technique**. Its elevation to the status of ***"scientific law"*** does not imply transforming it into a pure factual science, but rather into an applied **science** and one **technique founded on a solid body of scientific knowledge**.

To achieve this, the discipline must adopt the *"scientific attitude"* and the *"methodological skepticism"* that Bunge defends.

The path toward scientific law requires a research program that transcends exegesis and legal dogma. The following is recommended:

Redefining legal research to actively incorporate the **methods from** sociology, economics, social psychology, psychology, and statistics, among others.

Reformulate the legislation as the enunciation of **social hypotheses** which must be subjected to empirical testing before and after their promulgation.

Substantiate legal norms not only in moral principles or traditions, but explicitly in **objective social laws**.

Establish self-correction mechanisms in the legal system, where exceptions and failures to apply the rules are not dismissed, but rather used as data to refute or

refine underlying theories.

He **scientific law**It is an ambitious ideal that faces **significant challenges**, such as the difficulty of the **mathematization of social phenomena** and the **resistance of the legal system** to empirical refutation.

The effort to reach this horizon, by adopting the **rigor** and the **self-correcting approach to science,**can transform legal practice into a discipline **more effective, objective and socially relevant.** By integrating the **method of science**, the right could not only **regular** society, but also **understand it**, and from that understanding, derive the tools for its **sustainable improvement**.

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